An important public policy question is whether improved targeting of public spending will necessarily result in more or more cost-effective poverty reduction. In an important and influential study, Ravallion (2009) shows that targeting measures perform poorly as indicators of the poverty impact and costeffectiveness of an urban cash transfer program across China's provinces, and warns on this basis against reliance on assessments of targeting performance to inform policy choices in relation to poverty alleviation programs. The lack of a correlation between targeting and cost-effectiveness in reducing poverty is surprising, as it is unsupported by the theoretical literature and contradicts other empirical work. We suggest that this result arises because the comparison is across programs and income distributions. Through simulations, we confirm that the targeting and poverty performance of different programs, or even the same program, implemented across different distributions might be only weakly or even negatively correlated. But a more relevant, policy-oriented concern is to compare the performance of two or more programs in relation to the same distribution. In this case, we find, again through simulations, that the link between targeting and poverty impact depends on the changes made to the underlying targeting errors, but that there is a strong and positive correlation between targeting performance and cost-effectiveness. When the distribution of interest is different to the distributions in which the targeting performance is observed -that is, when assumptions of external validity are made -the correlation is weaker, but some targeting measures still perform well. Overall, targeting results need to be interpreted with care, but do provide useful information on the cost-effectiveness of transfer programs.
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Revisiting the relationship between targeting and program performance
Introduction
An important public policy question is whether improved targeting of public spending will necessarily result in more or more cost-effective poverty reduction. Ravallion (2009) titles his paper using precisely this question: "How relevant is targeting to the success of an antipoverty program?" Although he does not provide an explicit answer to this question, his implicit answer is in the negative. In the case he studies, he finds that "standard measures of targeting performance are uninformative or even deceptive about the impacts of poverty and cost-effectiveness in reducing poverty of a large cash transfer program in China" (p. 205).
Ravallion recommends that if we are interested in the poverty impact of anti-poverty programs we should measure it directly rather than inferring it from targeting measures. This is sound advice, but it leaves open the question of what to do in cases where data are not available to measure poverty impact. Many targeting studies are carried out based on wealth indices, which make it possible to rank households (and so conduct targeting analysis) but not to conduct poverty analysis (as one has no idea of the impact of the program on the consumption of the household). To cite one recent example of this widespread practice, Dutta et al. (2010) conduct targeting analysis to compare various social safety net programs in India. If Ravallion's warnings are heeded, such comparisons should not be relied on.
Extensive cross-country comparative studies have also been undertaken to explore the performance of different transfer programs. For example, Coady et al. (2004) review 122 programs in 44 countries to derive generalizations about which type of programs are better targeted. Ravallion cautions against this common practice of "finding what type of program works best … based on cross-program comparisons of targeting measures", arguing that his results show that their "external validity … is highly questionable" (p. 227).
Ravallion's results are not only important but have also been influential and widely accepted. See, for example, de Janvry et al. (2008) , Lavallee et al. (2010) , Roelen and Gassman (2010) , and Jha and Ramaswami (2010) . Yet, as we show below, his results give rise to two puzzles, one theoretical, the other empirical. To resolve these puzzles, we suggest that more attention needs to be given to exactly what question is being answered when one is comparing targeting and program performance. We distinguish between five different questions within this general area of interest. Ravallion answers the first of these five questions, but we show that the answers to some of the other questions within the group of five are quite different, and we argue that these other questions are of greater policy relevance.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 explains the puzzles which Ravallion's findings give rise to, and specifies the five research questions. Section 3 describes the methodology. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes.
Puzzles and questions
As Ravallion notes, the theoretical literature has provided several reasons to doubt whether better targeting will necessarily enhance a program's total impact on poverty.
First, the issues of incentives and labor supply responses have been raised by Besley and Kanbur (1990) , Kanbur et al. (1994) , and van de Walle (1998) . These papers point to the possibility that fine targeting will impose high marginal tax rates on recipients, thereby reducing the incentive of the poor to work and earn income. In turn, this could mean that the better targeted a program, the weaker its poverty impact. To illustrate this point, these papers all use the work of Sahn and Alderman (1996) on food subsidies in Sri Lanka as an example. Sahn and Alderman find that the food subsidy in 1979 in Sri Lanka was associated with a substantial reduction in labor supply of recipients.
Second, fine targeting carries the potential cost of reduced political support (Besley & Kanbur 1990; Gelbach & Pritchett 2000; Gelbach & Pritchett 2002) . Programs which benefit only the poor are vulnerable to cuts as the poor are "unlikely to have sufficient 3 political power to predominate against those above the poverty line who have to pay" (Besley & Kanbur 1990, p. 10) . This could mean that the more targeted a program, the smaller it is, and so the lower its impact on poverty.
Third, finer targeting might increase administrative or transaction costs. Again, this would weaken the link between targeting and program cost-effectiveness. Murgai and Ravallion (2005) argue that the costs imposed by an Indian public-works program in the form of foregone earnings result in better targeting but lower poverty impact and cost-effectiveness.
Ravallion claims that his empirical results echo these "warnings in the literature against relying on standard measures of targeting performance for informing policy choices on anti-poverty programs" (2009, p.227) . However, he does not specify which mechanism identified in the literature might be the one weakening the link between targeting and program performance in the cases he examines. He rules out any labor supply response (incomes in the absence of the program are simply pre-transfer incomes). Both political economy factors and administrative costs might weaken the link between targeting and poverty impact, but neither should weaken the link between targeting and cost-effectiveness (at least not when one defines costeffectiveness without reference to targeting costs, as he does). Ravallion's finding of a weak relationship between targeting measures and cost-effectiveness in reducing poverty in the absence of a labor supply response is thus a theoretical puzzle. 1
It is also an empirical puzzle, as the findings seem to contradict other studies in the literature. For instance, Baker and Grosh (1994) simulate geographic targeting schemes using household data for Venezuela, Mexico and Jamaica. They show that, as the geographic unit is more narrowly defined, both targeting accuracy, as measured by leakage and omission errors, and poverty impact improve (pp. 990-991). Elbers et al. (2007) employ "poverty maps" for Cambodia, Ecuador, and Madagascar and find similar results: targeting smaller administrative units, such as districts or villages, significantly improves both poverty impact and program cost-effectiveness. In 1 Ravallion finds that by some measures targeting performance is positively correlated with cost effectiveness, by some it is negatively correlated, and by some there is no significant correlation at all. 4 another paper Bisogno and Chong (2001) investigate the extent to which foreign aid reached the poor in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the civil war. Using a simple proxy means tests approach, their study shows that improving targeting accuracy in the aid delivery process could have yielded better coverage, lower leakage, and larger impact in terms of poverty reduction.
Our hypothesis is that these puzzles arise because of the types of comparisons between targeting and poverty performance which Ravallion makes. Ravallion examines the correlation between targeting and program performance of Di Bao, an urban cash transfer program implemented across 35 provinces in China. The Di Bao program is highly decentralized in financing and implementation. It is intended to provide all urban households with incomes below a poverty line with a cash transfer sufficient to bring them up to that line. The Chinese central government provides only general guidelines and co-finances the program. The local governments are responsible for setting the local poverty line, assessing participant eligibility, implementing, and co-funding the scheme. Given the wide variation in initial poverty incidence and severity, living standards, local government capability and budget, and the discretion given to municipal governments, Di Bao could in fact be considered as 35 individual programs implemented in 35 different income distributions.
In other words, Ravallion is addressing the question:
(Multiple populations question)
If scheme A in population X is better targeted than scheme B in population Y, will scheme A have a better program performance in X than scheme B does in Y?
In such a situation, where the comparison is over multiple populations, the correlation between targeting performance and poverty impact may easily be weakened, as the following example illustrates. A well-targeted scheme (A) could be implemented in a province (X) where there are very few people just below the poverty line, whilst a poorly-targeted scheme (B) could be implemented in a province (Y) where there are many people just below the poverty line. This could lead to a negative correlation between targeting and poverty impact (especially if the head-count ratio was used to 5 measure poverty). Indeed, Ravallion himself explains some of his findings in terms of initial conditions (p. 226).
To isolate the possible contaminating impact of initial conditions we can ask a second question:
(Initial conditions question)
If scheme A in population X is better targeted than scheme A in population Y, will it have a better program performance in X than in Y?
If initial conditions have a contaminating effect, then we would expect the answer to question 2, like the answer to question 1, to be "Not necessarily." Questions 1 and 2, however, are not the only way to examine the relationship between targeting and program performance. Indeed, we are more likely to be interested in comparing alternative or candidate programs in relation to a single population. This interest is captured by the question:
(Single population question)
If scheme A is better targeted than scheme B in population X, will it have a better program performance in X?
This "single population" question seems to be of greater policy relevance than the "multiple populations" question addressed in Ravallion (2009) . For example, we might well be interested in whether a country should expand its cash transfer or public works programs. If we knew that, say, the cash transfer program was better targeted, we would certainly want to know whether this meant it was a more costeffective way to reduce poverty. They are also (like question 3 and unlike questions 1 and 2) "single population" comparisons, since, in both, we want to compare two programs (A and B) in relation to a single or target population (X). However, unlike in question 3, in questions 4 and 5, the information about the two programs comes from their implementation on populations other than X, that is, external validity is invoked. If contamination by variation in initial conditions matters, as we have suggested it might, we cannot be confident a priori that we can give a positive answer to these final two questions.
External validity should not be assumed, it has to be demonstrated.
Questions 4 and 5 differ in the degree of external validity required for a positive answer. In question 4, the programs of interest are all evaluated in relation to a single population and we want to know whether relative targeting performance in that population allows conclusions to be drawn in relation to relative program performance in a second population. For example, if cash transfers are better targeted than public works in India, will cash transfers perform better at reducing poverty than public works in China? Question 5 provides a more direct test of the validity of the cross-country targeting comparisons that have been compiled. Is it sound to infer, for example, that if a cash transfer in Bangladesh is better targeted than a public works program in India, the cash transfers program would have a better program performance than the public works program if both were implemented in China?
Since it covers a greater range of populations, the scope for contamination by variation in initial conditions in question 5 is correspondingly greater.
Methodology
This section presents a simulation framework that allows us to answer the five questions discussed above. It allows for both single and multiple population comparisons. It also gives flexible control over the degree of targeting inaccuracy of different targeting cash-transfer schemes.
We employ the same behavioural assumptions as Ravallion (2009). The simulated programs are thus assumed to be financed through aid and to have no redistributional effect on income of targeted populations through the tax system.
Targeting costs and incentive effects are assumed away. Post-transfer household income equals pre-transfer income plus the cash transfer.
Generation of household income data
The lognormal distribution is one of the two most frequently used functional forms of income distribution. The other, the Pareto distribution, is appropriate only for the upper end of the income distribution, while its fit over the whole range of income is limited (Boccanfuso et al. 2008) . The lognormal functional form has been widely used to study poverty in the literature, including Balintfy and Goodman (1973) , Bourguignon (2003) , Epaulard (2003) , Lopex and Serven (2006) , and Kalwij and Verschoor (2006) . It provides a good fit for real income data across countries (Aitchinson & Brown 1957; Bandourian et al. 2003) . Moreover, it is relatively tractable. We can also take advantage of its ease in interpreting and manipulating the parameters to achieve desired characteristics of the pre-transfer income distribution.
This property is particularly important for our study, since we need to generate income distributions with different levels of mean and variance.
Admittedly, the use of the lognormal distribution in poverty analysis has some limitations. Although it fits well over much of the income range, its fit towards the 8 upper end of the income distribution is not very satisfactory (Balintfy & Goodman 1973, p. 402; Harrison 1981; Cowell 1999; Boccanfuso et al. 2008, p. 155) . In general, the lognormal function fits income distribution for a fairly homogeneous population.
It "collapses the heterogeneity of both the shape of observed income distributions and the spectrum of its potential evolutions" (Bresson 2010) . Better fitting functional forms such as the three or four-parameter Dagum distribution or the Singh-Maddala distribution are more complex and limit the flexibility in generating desired characteristics of the hypothetical distributions. In short, these shortcomings of the lognormal functional form do not impose any serious limitation on our analysis.
Following Lambert (2009) and Boccanfuso et al. (2008) , we generate hypothetical household income data using a displaced lognormal distribution: To facilitate cross-population comparisons, we generate 50 hypothetical income distributions whose Gini index is consistent with the actual range of low and lowmiddle income countries (from 0.31 to 0.57, with an average of 0.41). Each distribution (or population) has 10,000 observations. The 50 distributions are generated such that among the first 25, the higher the inequality, the higher the pretransfer poverty. Among the last 25, the higher the inequality, the lower the poverty.
The range of mean incomes of the last 25 distributions is also wider than that of the first 25. See Appendix B1 for details of the 50 distributions.
Simulation of targeted cash-transfer programs
As often done in empirical poverty studies, we employ the relative poverty line approach to define the poverty line as a fixed proportion of mean household income (Bisogno & Chong 2001; Layte et al. 2001, p. 241) . For each income distribution generated, as described earlier, the poverty line z is defined as 60% of the pre-transfer mean income. Each participating household will receive a uniform transfer amount t equal to 10% of the mean income.
Under perfect targeting
where yi is income of household i.
Perfect targeting is not feasible due to such factors as measurement errors in
household welfare level, flaws in the benefit delivery process, and corruption. The literature on targeting often considers the leakage error (Type 1), i.e. the inclusion of non-poor participants who are incorrectly identified as poor, and the omission error (Type 2), i.e. the exclusion of the poor mistakenly identified as non-poor. Neither of these two conventional targeting errors considers whether a recipient receives the correct benefit amount or only a portion of it. Implementation-related factors such as corruption might prevent participants from receiving the full benefit they are supposed to (see, for example, Dutta et al. (2010)) or enable non-eligible households to receive part of the benefit. We call these "under-transfer" and "over-transfer" errors, when they occur to the poor and the non-poor respectively. So in our simulated context, imperfect targeting is characterized by four types of errors: the conventional omission error, a modified leakage error, and the two new proposed under-transfer and over-transfer errors. In this context, omission error is still the proportion of pre-transfer poor who receive nothing at all, as conventionally defined in the literature. The modified leakage error is now defined as the proportion of the non-poor who receive the full transfer amount. The under-(over-) transfer error is the portion of the poor (non-poor) who receive a portion of the transfer amount. Thus the coverage rate of the poor is one minus the omission error, while the coverage rate of the rich is the sum of the leakage error and the over-transfer error.
We simulate transfer programs by first separating the population into two groups based on the chosen poverty line: the pre-transfer poor and non-poor, consisting of n and m households respectively, where n+m=N, the size of the population. In order to simulate targeting errors, we generate three uniformly and independently distributed random variables between 0 and 1 as follows:
Household i is assigned ri and either u P i or u N i depending on its pre-transfer poverty status. With this set up, any targeting scheme can be defined as shown in Table 1 . Note: the sum of leakage error and over-transfer error, as defined above, equal the conventional Type 1 error, which is the overall leakage of transfers to the non-poor.
For any program implemented on any population, the simulation process is repeated 50 times to obtain the expected targeting and program performance, which are calculated as the average of these 50 simulated outcomes.
We define 50 programs whose 4 errors are randomly selected through a uniform distribution within ranges roughly suggested by the Di Bao program, namely 30% to 80% for the omission error, 0.5% to 5% for leakage, 5% to 15% for under-transfer, and 0.5% to 3% for over-transfer (see Appendices C1 and C2). Each program is a combination of four errors randomly selected within these ranges.
To explore the potential influence of targeting accuracy on the link between targeting measures and program performance, we also define a base program, A, which has similar targeting errors to the Di Bao average. Specifically, it is assumed that in program A 50% of the poor are completely excluded from the program, another 20% of the poor are only partially covered, 20% of non-poor households are fully covered and another 20% of the non-poor are partially covered by the scheme. We then define a range of programs Bj, Cj, Dj and Ej (j=1 to 20), each of which systematically improves on A by discretely lowering omission error (the B programs), under-payment to the poor (the C programs), leakage error (the D programs), or over-payment to the nonpoor (the E programs). The design of these comparator schemes is shown in Table 2 below. For example, schemes Bj (j=1,2,…20) are simulated by reducing the omission error from 50%to 30% , one percentage point at a time, keeping all other parameters of the scheme unchanged. Schemes Cj, Dj, and Ej are simulated similarly by reducing the under-transfer, leakage, and over-transfer errors respectively. 
Results
Having set up the simulation framework, we now address the five questions formulated at the end of Section 2.
Comparisons over multiple populations
As discussed in Section 2, Ravallion's study addresses question 1 since he compares targeting and program performance across both programs and populations. We confirm the weak overall link between targeting and program performance he obtains when we randomly assign 50 simulated transfer programs to the 50 hypothetical populations (see Table 3 ). Consistent with Ravallion's calculations, we get mixed results. TD is the best indicator of poverty impact, but has no significant correlation with cost-effectiveness. CI and NS perform poorly as indicators of poverty impact. The only notable difference between our simulated output and Ravallion's is that we find significant correlations between S and poverty reduction impact and between NS and program cost-effectiveness. As revealed later, this could be explained by the fact that our hypothetical income 15 distributions are more homogeneous than those of China's provinces in terms of mean income, inequality and initial poverty rate.
We attribute these mixed results in part to the initial characteristics of the income distributions, which weaken the link between targeting and program performance. To isolate this effect, we turn to the second question and implement a single program, namely the base scheme, A, over the same 50 populations. In the absence of the variation in targeting errors across different programs, most of the correlations are significant, either positive or negative (see Table 4 ). If the relationship between targeting and program performance was not sensitive to the pre-transfer characteristics of the income distributions, then we would be unlikely to find any significant correlation between these two variables for the same scheme implemented over a number of populations. The significant correlations found in Table 4 suggest that initial conditions do have a strong influence on the relationship between targeting and program performance across distributions. Table 5 explains the signs of the correlations found in Table 4 and further confirms our hypothesis regarding the importance of pre-transfer conditions. As can be seen in Table 5 , the higher the initial poverty, the smaller (larger) the poverty impact of the scheme as measured by the reduction in the headcount ratio (PG or SPG). Also, whichever poverty measure is used, the higher the initial poverty, the poorer (better) the targeting of the scheme as measured by NS (S or CI). As a result, NS is positively correlated with the reduction in poverty rate yet negatively correlated with the reduction in poverty gap and squared poverty gap. The opposite applies to S and CI. 2 Note that these results are not robust to the transfer size. When we (unrealistically) increased the transfer amount to 40% of the mean income, we found a sign reversal of the correlation between initial poverty measures and reduction in HC and costeffectiveness in reducing HC. The correlation between cost-effectiveness in reducing HC and initial headcount ratio even becomes statistically significant. It remains the case, however, that variation in initial conditions makes it impossible to predict with confidence the relationship between targeting and program performance across income distributions. 2 We cannot test for the influence of initial conditions on TD in this way because of the way that measure is defined. By definition, TD equals 1 minus omission error, leakage error, and over-transfer error (see Appendix A). For a simulated program, TD is constant since the targeting errors used to simulate the program are fixed. Hence, TD is independent of initial conditions of income distribution.
Comparisons in relation to a single population
We now turn to the third question: whether, in relation to a single population, a better targeted scheme has better program performance. To answer this question, we rely on random selection from our sets of 50 schemes and 50 hypothetical populations. In each round of simulation, we randomly pick two schemes and one population and compare the performance of these two schemes on the chosen population. After 50 rounds, we test if relative targeting performance is correlated with relative poverty reduction and program cost-effectiveness.
As shown in Table 6 , all the correlations between relative targeting and program performance are positive and statistically significant at 1% level, no matter which targeting measure is employed. As before, TD has the strongest link with poverty reduction, yet is the weakest indicator of cost-effectiveness. In general, these results support the hypothesis that targeting performance is indicative of program performance. If one scheme is better targeted than another in the same population then it is likely to be more cost-effective and result in a larger reduction in the poverty rate in that population. Table 7 shows that the correlation between targeting and cost-effectiveness is very high. We find a significant (at the 1 percent level) positive correlation between all targeting measures and cost-effectiveness, no matter which targeting error is corrected. 3 Table 7 Table 6 tells us 19 that on average better targeted programs will have a greater poverty impact, Table 7 reveals that it is more informative when it comes to poverty impact to compare not targeting performance, as assessed by conventional measures, but the variation in the underlying targeting errors. The mixed influence of the four targeting errors on poverty reduction explains the statistically significant but often considerably weaker correlation between targeting and poverty impact than between targeting and costeffectiveness in Table 6 . It may also partially explain the weak link between targeting and poverty impact in Ravallion (2009). 
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Comparisons in relation to a single population based on external validity
The previous sub-section shows that targeting analysis undertaken within a single population (perhaps because poverty analysis is infeasible) can be used to make inferences about program cost-effectiveness in relation to that same population. What remains are the questions of external validity, i.e. whether targeting analysis in relation to one population can be used to infer program performance in another.
Answering these questions will verify whether the exhaustive cross-country comparisons of targeting performance in the literature in recent years are of use for making program performance predictions.
We answer the first external validity question by examining the correlation between relative targeting and relative program performance of two random schemes on two randomly-selected populations. From our 50 simulated transfer schemes and 50 populations, we randomly draw 50 sets of 2 schemes and 2 populations. Table 8 shows that programs that do better in one population in terms of targeting also tend to do better in the other population in terms of program performance. There is high "external validity", to use Ravallion's term. Finally, we address the fifth question by examining the correlation between relative targeting performance of two random schemes across two randomly-selected populations and their relative program performance on a third randomly-selected population. This is where one would expect the influence of the variation in initial conditions to be the most serious. Table 9 reports the results of four rounds 4 of simulations, where each round consists of 50 draws of a program pair, and three populations. Again, all targeting measures are consistently positively and significantly correlated with program costeffectiveness. All targeting measures, except NS, are significant predictors of poverty impact, though the size of the correlations is lower than for cost-effectiveness. As in the previous simulation settings (Questions 3 and 4), TD seems to be the best indicator of poverty reduction, yet the worst of cost-effectiveness.
The (in general) smaller correlations in Table 9 compared to Table 8 also demonstrate the contaminating impact of initial conditions. It appears that NS is more prone to contamination than the other targeting measures. The correlations between NS and poverty impact are either insignificant or statistically significant but weak. This result is consistent with Table 3 , where NS is not a good indicator of reduction in PG and SPG when program comparison is undertaken across different populations. Its correlations with cost-effectiveness, though statistically significant, are often considerably weaker than those of S and CI. 
Conclusion
Our simulations confirm Ravallion's (2009) Sample 2: Impact of targeting errors on poverty measures
